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Abstract
Research in adversarial learning follows a cat and mouse game between attackers
and defenders where attacks are proposed, they are mitigated by new defenses,
and subsequently new attacks are proposed that break earlier defenses, and so
on. However, it has remained unclear as to whether there are conditions under
which no better attacks or defenses can be proposed. In this paper, we propose a
game-theoretic framework for studying attacks and defenses which exist in equi-
librium. Under a locally linear decision boundary model for the underlying binary
classifier, we prove that the Fast Gradient Method attack and the Randomized
Smoothing defense form a Nash Equilibrium. We then show how this equilibrium
defense can be approximated given finitely many samples from a data-generating
distribution, and derive a generalization bound for the performance of our approx-
imation.
1 Introduction
Neural network classifiers have been shown to be vulnerable to additive perturbations to the input,
which can cause an anomalous change in the classification output. There are several attack methods
to compute such perturbations for any input instance which assume access to the model gradient
information, e.g., Fast Gradient Sign Method [10] and Projected Gradient Method [21]. In response
to such additive attacks, researchers have proposed many additive defense methods with varying
levels of success, e.g., Randomized Smoothing [5]. However, it has been later discovered that a
lot of these defenses are in turn susceptible to further additive attacks handcrafted for the particular
defenses, e.g., Carlini-Wagner [1]. This back and forth where attacks are proposed breaking previous
defenses and then further defenses are proposed mitigating earlier attacks has been going on for
some time in the community and there are several open questions to be answered. Can all defenses
be broken, or do there exist defenses for which we can get provable guarantees? Similarly, does
there always exist a defense against any attack, or are there attacks with provable performance
degradation guarantees? Do there exist scenarios under which attackers always win, and similarly
scenarios where defenders always win? Are there conditions under which an equilibrium between
attacks and defenses exist?
In this work, we answer some of these questions in the affirmative in a binary classification setting
with locally linear decision boundaries. Specifically, we find a pair of attack A and defenseD such
that if the attacker uses A, then there is no defense which can perform better thanD, and vice versa.
Our approach can be seen as a novel way to obtain both provable attacks and provable defenses,
complementing recent advances on certifiable defenses in the literature ([31, 2, 13, 7, 30, 12, 17, 19]).
To summarize, our contributions are as follows:
1. We introduce a game-theoretic framework for studying equilibria of attacks and defenses on an
underlying binary classifier. In order to do so, we first specify the capabilities, i.e., the changes
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the attacker and defender are allowed to make to the input, the amount of knowledge the attacker
and the defender have about each other, and formalize the strategies that they can follow.
2. We show that the Fast Gradient Method attack and the a Randomized Smoothing defense form a
Nash Equilibriumunder the assumption of a zero-sum gamewith locally linear decision boundary
for the underlying binary classifier and full knowledge of the data-generating distribution.
3. We propose an optimization-based method to approximate the optimal defense given access to a
finite training set of n independent samples and we derive generalization bounds on the perfor-
mance of this finite-sample approximation. Our bounds show that the approximation approaches
the optimal defense at a fast rate of O(
√
logn/n) with the number of samples n.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we describe the proposed game theoretic
setup. In Section 3 we state our main result showing the existence of an optimal attack and defense.
This is followed by Section 4 where we propose an optimization method to approximate the optimal
defense, and provide some experiments validating our methods and models. Section 4 presents a
generalization analysis showing that the proposed approximation approaches the optimal defense at
a fast rate. Finally we conclude in Section 6 by putting our work into perspective with related work.
2 A Game Theoretic Setup for Additive Adversarial Attacks and Defenses
We will denote a random variable with an upper-case letter, e.g., X , and a realization of a random
variable with a lower-case letter, e.g., x. We will consider a binary classification task with data
distribution pX defined over the input space X ⊂ R
m. The true decision boundary corresponding
to the discrete labels {−1,+1} will be defined by the zero-contour of a classifier f : X → R, i.e.,
{x : f(x) = 0}, and the label of each data point x ∈ X will be given by sgn(f(x)).
We will define a two-player, single-shot, simultaneous, zero-sum game between an attacker A and
a defenderD. In this setting the attacker and defender are allowed to simultaneously make additive
perturbations a(x) and d(x), respectively, for a given a data point x, i.e., both A and D submit
their perturbation at the same time and the perturbed point is x + a(x) + d(x). The size of each
perturbation is limited to be at most ǫ in ℓ2 norm, i.e., for all x ∈ X , a(x), d(x) ∈ V , where
V := {v : ‖v‖2 ≤ ǫ}.
The score uA assigned toA is determined by whether the label of the data point x has changed under
a locally linear approximation of f around x after both the perturbations a(x) and d(x) are applied:
uA(x, a(x), d(x)) =
{
+1 if sgn(fL(x)) 6= sgn(fL(x+ a(x) + d(x)))
−1 otherwise.
(1)
In the above, fL(x
′) = f(x) +∇f(x)⊤(x′ − x) is a linear approximation of f in the 2ǫ neighbour-
hood of x. Similarly, the score uD assigned to D is defined as the negative of the utility assigned to
A, i.e., uD(x, a, d) = −uA(x, a, d) for all (x, a, d), thus making the game zero-sum.
Note that the locally linear model assumption holds whenever the data distribution places no mass
in regions of space that are less than 2ǫ distance away from curved parts of the decision boundary.
Concretely, for a neural network with ReLU activations, the assumption holds whenever none of the
data points lie very close to the intersection of 2 or more hyperplanes which make up the classifica-
tion boundaries. This is reasonable as such regions form a set of measure zero in the input space. We
refer the reader to [24] for a more detailed discussion about the validity of such locally-flat boundary
assumptions for deep neural networks.
A deterministic strategy for the attacker consists of choosing a function a : X → V which dictates
the perturbation a(x) that is made by A for the point x ∈ X . Hence, the action space, i.e., the set of
all deterministic strategies that can be followed by the attacker, is the function setAA = {a|a : X →
V }.
A deterministic strategy for the defender consists of the set of all constant functions, i.e., functions
which take the same perturbation direction for each point x ∈ X . Hence the action space AD for
the defender consists of the function set AD = {dv|v ∈ V, dv : X → V s.t. ∀x ∈ X , dv(x) = v}.
Since each deterministic strategy for the defender can be uniquely with a point v ∈ V , the reader
can think of AD as V for ease of understanding. The reasons for constraining the set of strategies
for the defender are twofold: first, we want to model existing literature in adversarial attacks where
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Figure 1: The decision boundary is given by the dashed line. In order for our locally linear modeling assumption
to hold, data-points should lie anywhere except in the red regions, i.e., within 2ǫ distance to a half-plane inter-
section. The green shaded regions show the geometry of the robust sets R(x), which follows from Lemma 1.
Observe that R(x) becomes larger as x moves farther away from the decision boundary.
defenders typically follow a single strategy (e.g., smooth input, quantize input) agnostic of the test
data point. Second, this restriction captures the fact that defenders are typically given the adversari-
ally perturbed input x+a(x) and are expected to fix it without knowing the original label or original
data point x (and hence have to use a strategy that is agnostic to the relation between the data point
and its label).
In reality, attackers and defenders can choose even randomized strategies, where the function a or d
is sampled according to some probability density on the set of allowed deterministic strategies. Such
a randomized strategy sA for the attacker is specified by a density pA ∈ P(AA), where we define
P(AA) to be the set of all probability densities over AA. Similarly, a randomized strategy sD for
the defender is specified by a density pD ∈ P(AD). Given a pair of strategies (sA, sD), we define
the utility function of the attacker, u¯A : P(AA)× P(AD)→ R as follows:
u¯A(sA, sD) = E
x∼pX ,a∼pA,d∼pD
uA(x, a(x), d(x)) (2)
Note that since the game is zero-sum, the corresponding utility function u¯D for the defender is just
the negative of that for the attacker. To complete the setup, we specify that both the attacker and
defender have perfect knowledge about the (possibly randomized) strategy that the other follows,
and have access to the linear approximation fL around any data point x. In summary, we have a
white-box evasion attack scenario and aim to analyze preprocessing attacks and defenses (i.e. they
preprocess the input before they are fed to the classifier) that make additive perturbations to the
input.
In the following section, we will further assume bothA andD have access to the full data-generating
distribution pX in order to derive the optimal attack and defense strategy. We will show later that this
assumption is not needed in practice by constructing an approximation given finitely many samples
from pX . We will then prove that this approximation approaches the true optimum at a fast rate.
3 A Characterization of Optimal Attack and Defense Strategies
In this section, we will show in Theorem 1 that the FGM attack and Randomized Smoothing defense
exist in a Nash Equilibrium, i.e., if A follows the strategy defined by the FGM attack thenD cannot
do better than following a randomized smoothing strategy, and vice-versa. In order to show this, we
will first establish in Lemma 2 that the FGM attack is the best response to any defense in our setting,
and then show in Lemma 3 that randomized smoothing is a best response to FGM. Together, these
lemmas would lead to our main result. Before stating our results, we begin by defining the robust
set.
Definition 1 (Robust set). The robust set R(x) = {v : v ∈ V s.t. ∀v′ ∈ V uA(x, v
′, v) = −1} of a
point x ∈ X is the subset of allowed perturbations v ∈ V such that if the defender plays v at x, then
the attacker always gets an utility of −1, i.e., the least possible utility, no matter what she plays.
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Lemma 1 shows that R(x) is the intersection of a half-plane with V , as illustrated by the green
shaded regions in Fig. 1. Observe that when x is far from the decision boundary, the robust set is
equal to V .
Lemma 1 (Geometry of the robust set). For any x ∈ X , the robust set R(x) is given by
R(x) = {v : sgn(f(x))(f(x) +∇f(x)⊤v)− ǫ‖∇f(x)‖ ≥ 0} ∩ {v : ‖v‖2 ≤ ǫ}. (3)
Interestingly, the proof of the lemma shows that for a fixed x, in order for v to achieve uA(x, v
′, v) =
−1 for all v′ ∈ V , it is sufficient to ensure that uA(x, v
′, v) = −1 when v′ is chosen according to
the Fast Gradient Method (FGM). The FGM attack was proposed in [10] and makes the additive
perturbation aFGM(x) = −ǫ
sgn(f(x))
‖∇f(x)‖2
∇f(x). Note that the original attack was called Fast Gradient
Sign Method, as it was derived for ℓ∞ bounded perturbations. The same attack for ℓ2 bounded
perturbations is called the FGM attack. Since this attack does not involve any randomness, the
strategy sFGM followed by the attacker in our framework places probability 1 on the function aFGM.
Lemma 2 (FGM is a best-response to any defense). For any strategy sD ∈ P(AD) played by
the defenderD, the strategy sFGM ∈ P(AA) played by the attacker A achieves the largest possible
utility against sD, i.e., u¯A(sFGM, sD) ≥ u¯A(sA, sD) for all sA ∈ P(AA).
Having established the optimality of the FGM attack, we now turn our attention to finding an optimal
defense strategy. To that end, we define an instance of the Randomized Smoothing defense proposed
in [5] that will be shown to be a best-response to FGM. For any perturbation v ∈ V , we define φ(v)
to be the measure of the set of points in X whose robust sets cointain v:
φ(v) =
∫
X
1[R(x) ∋ v]pX(x)dx (4)
To define sSMOOTH we need to specify the probability distribution pSMOOTH ∈ P(AD). The idea
is to sample uniformly from the set of maximizers of φ, i.e., V ∗ = {v∗ : φ(v∗) ≥ φ(v), ∀v ∈
V }. Accordingly, our defense strategy sSMOOTH samples from a uniform distribution over the set of
functions F ∗ = {dv∗ : v
∗ ∈ V ∗} ⊆ AD, where recall dv : X → V is the constant function defined
as ∀x ∈ X dv(x) = v.
Lemma 3 (Randomized Smoothing is a best-response to FGM). The strategy sSMOOTH achieves
the largest possible utility for the defender against the attack sFGM played by the attacker, i.e., for
any defense sD ∈ P(AD) we have u¯D(sFGM, sSMOOTH) ≥ u¯D(sFGM, sD).
Note that Lemma 2 is a stronger result than we need for our further analysis, and we will only be
using the following implication of Lemma 2:
Corollary 2.1 (FGM is a best-response to Randomized Smoothing). The strategy sFGM ∈
P(AA) played by the attacker A achieves the largest possible utility against sSMOOTH, i.e.,
u¯A(sFGM, sSMOOTH) ≥ u¯A(sA, sSMOOTH) for all sA ∈ P(AA).
As a consequence of Corollary 2.1 and Lemma 3 we have established our main result, as follows:
Theorem 1 ((FGM, Randomized Smoothing) form a Nash Equilibrium). Neither player
gains utility by unilaterally deviating when A plays sFGM and D plays sSMOOTH, i.e., ∀sA ∈
P(AA), sD ∈ P(AD), we have u¯A(sFGM, sSMOOTH) ≥ u¯A(sA, sSMOOTH) and u¯D(sFGM, sSMOOTH) ≥
u¯D(sFGM, sD).
As we saw in this section, we need access to the full data-generating distribution pX in order to
compute ssmooth, which is an unreasonable assumption in practice. Hence, in the following section
we will demonstrate how one can approximate ssmooth given access to finitely many samples from
pX .
4 Approximation Properties: How to compute the optimal defense?
As we saw in Section 3, the optimal defense relies on the knowledge of the subset of perturbation
directions that maximize φ, V ∗, which in turns depends on the distribution pX of the input data.
Given n i.i.d. samplesX1, X2, . . . , Xn ∼ pX , we define the finite-sample approximation of φ as:
φn(v) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
1[v ∈ R(Xi)]. (5)
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A straightforward modification of the proof of Lemma 3 shows that the same result can be obtained
even if psmooth places all its mass on a single element of V
∗. That is, an optimal defense can also be
achieved by a deterministic strategy. Hence, our goal will now be to solve the following problem:
v∗n = max
v
φn(v) subject to ‖v‖2 ≤ ǫ. (6)
Recall from Lemma 1 that the robust set at xi can be written as R(xi) = {v ∈ V : c
⊤
i v + bi ≥ 0},
where ci = sgn(f(xi))∇f(xi) and bi = |f(xi)| − ǫ‖∇f(xi)‖. Therefore, we obtain the following
equivalent version of Eq. (6):
max
v
1
n
n∑
i=1
1[c⊤i v + bi ≥ 0] subject to ‖v‖2 ≤ ǫ. (7)
Observe that the objective in (7) takes values in {0, 1
n
, 2
n
, . . . , 1} and it is equal to 1 iff there is a
v with ‖v‖ ≤ ǫ such that c⊤i v + bi ≥ 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n. Trivially, this happens if bi ≥ 0
for all i = 1, . . . , n, in which case we can choose v = 0, meaning that no defense is needed. By
inspection, we see that bi ≥ 0 when |f(xi)| is large, meaning that the classifier is confident about its
prediction, and ‖∇f(xi)‖ is small, meaning that the response of the classifier is not very sensitive
to input perturbations. This is very consistent with our intuition that defenses are needed when the
classifier is not very confident (small |f(xi)|) or its response is sensitive to input perturbations (large
‖∇f(xi)‖).
To solve the optimization problem in (7), consider the case where there is a single sample, i.e., n = 1.
In this case, if the half-spaceH = {v : c⊤1 v+b1 ≥ 0} does not intersect the hypersphereB(0, ǫ), then
any v∗ ∈ V is a solution to (7) with φ(v∗) = 0. Else, if H intersects the hypersphere, a solution
is given by the projection of the origin onto H, which gives φ(v∗) = 1 (see left panel of Fig. 2 for
illustration). When n = 2, there are up to two hyperplanes, which divide the space into at most
4 regions. When no half-space intersects the hypersphere, any v∗ ∈ V is an optimal solution and
φ(v∗) = 0. When only one half-space intersects the hypersphere, as before an optimal solution is
given by the projection of the origin onto the half-space, which gives φ(v∗) = 1/2. When both half-
spaces intersect the hypersphere, but the half-spaces intersect each other outside the hypersphere, v∗
can be the projection of the origin onto either half-space. It is only when both half-spaces intersect
inside the hypersphere we have φ(v∗) = 1 and a maximizer is given by the projection of the origin
onto the intersection of both half-spaces (see right panel of Fig. 2 for illustration). However, as n in-
creases, the number of regions grows exponentially in n, rendering such a direct region-enumeration
intractable. We thus follow an optimization-based approach to find an approximate maximizer of
(7). More specifically, we use projected gradient descent on v with the constraint set ‖v‖2 ≤ ǫ to
solve the optimization problem in (7) and obtain v̂∗n. Additionally, as the gradients of the indicator
function are not very useful, we use the relaxation 1[α ≥ 0] ≥ min(max(0, α), 1) and optimize the
RHS.
Table 1: Attacks and Defenses for MNIST 0 vs 1. The FGM attack and
SMOOTH defense correspond to sFGM and sSMOOTH respectively. The PGD
attack [21] is an iterated version of FGM. True Accuracy shows accuracies us-
ing the true classifier f and Approximate Accuracy shows accuracies according
to the locally linear approximation fL. Detailed descriptions can be found in
the Appendix.
Attack Defense True Accuracy (%) Approximate Accuracy (%)
- - 99.9 99.9
FGM - 63.0 48.3
FGM SMOOTH 95.6 94.5
PGD - 47.7 85.6
PGD SMOOTH 75.1 99.1
Our experiments are
conducted on the MNIST
dataset restricted to two
classes corresponding to
the digits 0 and 1. We
train a 4-layer convolu-
tional neural network
with ReLU activation
functions for the binary
classification task. The
classification results are
shown in Table 1, from
which we can draw two
main conclusions: (1) If
the defender uses the equilibrium defense, then the attacker gets the most reduction in approximate
accuracy when using the equilibrium attack, as using any other attack improves the performance of
the defended classifier. A similar statement holds from the other side. (2) The equilibrium defense
SMOOTH leads to significant gains in true accuracy against both FGM and PGD, even though it is
computed assuming our locally linear model. This signals that our modeling assumptions are valid
to a large extent.
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5 Generalization Properties of the Approximation to the Optimal Defense
In the previous section, we saw how to practically approximate the optimal defense as v∗n given
access to a finite number of samples drawn i.i.d. from the data distribution pX . But how good is
this approximation? In this section, we derive generalization bounds showing that φ(v∗n) approaches
φ(v∗) at a fast rate w.r.t. n. Before proceeding, we review some necessary results from learning the-
ory.
Learning theory review. A function h : Rm × . . . × Rm → R is said to satisfy the bounded
difference assumption if for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n there exists finite ci ∈ R such that:
sup
x1,x2,...,xi,...xn,x
′
i
∈Rm
|h(x1, x2, . . . , xi, . . . , xn)− h(x1, x2, . . . , x
′
i, . . . , xn)| ≤ ci. (8)
In other words, the bounded difference assumption states that h changes by at most a finite amount if
any of the individual inputs are changed, while keeping all others constant. Now, let h be a function
satisfying the bounded difference assumption, and X1, . . . , Xn ∼ pX be i.i.d. random variables.
Then, h satisfies the following useful property called the McDiarmid’s inequality, which shows that
that the function values of h are tightly concentrated around the mean:
Pr
[
|h(X1, . . . , Xn)− E
X1,...,Xn∼pX
h(X1, . . . , Xn)| > ǫ
]
≤ exp
{ −2ǫ2∑
i c
2
i
}
. (9)
Next we need some results from Vapnik-Chervonenkis Theory. Let X1, . . . , Xn ∼ pX be i.i.d.
random variables each taking values in Rm. Let B be a family of subsets of Rm. Let B ∈ B be
any subset in the family. Define µ as µ(B) = Pr[X1 ∈ B]. Further, given a particular realization
x1, . . . , xn of X1, . . . Xn, define the finite-sample approximation µn as µn(B) =
1
n
∑n
i=1 1[Xi ∈
B]. In other words, µ(B) is the probability that a sample from pX lies in B, and µn(B) estimates
this probability using n samples from D. Taking h(x1, . . . , xn) = supB∈B |µn(B) − µ(B)| in
McDiarmid’s inequality, we observe that ci =
1
n
and we get the following:
Pr
[∣∣∣ sup
B∈B
|µn(B)− µ(B)| − E
X1,...,Xn∼pX
sup
B∈B
|µn(B) − µ(B)|
∣∣∣ > ǫ] ≤ exp{− 2nǫ2}. (10)
In other words, we see that the maximum inaccuracy incurred in estimating Pr[X1 ∈ B] from finite
samples is tightly concentrated around the mean. The final piece we need from VC theory is an
upper bound on this mean inaccuracy:
E
X1,...,Xn∼pX
sup
B∈B
∣∣∣µn(B)− µ(B)∣∣∣ ≤ 2
√
2 logSB(n)
n
, (11)
where SB(n) is the shatter coefficient for the family B, which is defined as follows:
SB(n) = sup
x1,x2,...,xn∈Rm
∣∣∣{{x1, x2, . . . , xn} ∩B : B ∈ B}∣∣∣. (12)
In the above, each of the terms being considered in the supremum counts the number of distinct
intersections with members of B. For illustration, say we are working in R2, and let B be the family
of subsets generated by taking each rectangle r in the plane and considering Br to be the points
contained in r. Now given any 3 points {x1, x2, x3} in the plane, we can find rectangles r such that
{x1, x2, x3} ∩ Br equals each of the 8 possible subsets {}, {x1}, {x2}, {x1, x2}, . . . , {x1, x2, x3}.
This shows that SB(3) ≥ 8 (which implies SB(3) = 8 as SB(n) ≤ 2
n).
In other words, the shatter coefficient at n equals the largest p such that n points can be broken into
p subsets by members of B. Hence, SB(n) ≥ p implies there exists at least one such example of
x1, . . . , xn that can be broken into p subsets. On the other hand, SB(n) < p + 1 implies that for
every choice of n points, they cannot be broken into p+ 1 or more distinct sets by members in B.
Generalization bound. We will now apply the above literature to our setup. Going forward, we
will think of n as being the size of the entire training data that is available to us. Recall that in our
setting, we are given a fixed base classifier f . Given f , and a sample x1, . . . , xn, we know the robust
sets R(x1), R(x2), . . . , R(xn). For each direction that can be taken by the defender, i.e., v ∈ V , we
define Bv to be the subset of X for which v is a robust direction as:
Bv = {x ∈ X : v ∈ R(x)}. (13)
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Now we can define the family of subsets B = {Bv : v ∈ V }. With this definition, we can see that φ
corresponds to µ, and φn corresponds to µn as:
φ(v) := µ(Bv) = Pr[X1 ∈ Bv] = Pr[v ∈ R(X1)] (14)
φn(v) :=
n∑
i=1
1[v ∈ R(xi)] = µn(Bv). (15)
Given the base classifier f and the training data, we used an optimization algorithm to obtain the
maximizer of φn(v) in Section 4. We will assume for the purposes of this section that there is
no optimization error, i.e., our optimizer finds the best direction for the given training data, i.e.,
v∗n = argmaxv φn(v). We are interested in the difference between φ(v
∗
n) and φ(v
∗) , i.e.:
φ(v∗)− φ(v∗n) =
(
φ(v∗)− φn(v
∗
n)
)
+
(
φn(v
∗
n)− φ(v
∗
n)
)
(16)
≤ |φ(v∗)− φn(v
∗)|+ |φn(v
∗
n)− φ(v
∗
n)| (17)
≤ sup
v
|φ(v)− φn(v)|+ sup
v
|φn(v)− φ(v)| = 2 sup
v
|φ(v)− φn(v)|. (18)
In other words, we can get an upper bound on the quantity of interest by analysing supv |φ(v) −
φn(v)|, which is the largest inaccuracy we get due to estimating φ(v) from a finite number of sam-
ples. (10) shows that this quantity is sharply concentrated at its mean, which can be upper bounded
by (11) as:
E
X1,...,Xn∼pX
sup
v∈V
∣∣∣φn(v)− φ(v)∣∣∣ ≤ 2
√
2 logSB(n)
n
. (19)
Hence, the problem boils down to getting an upper bound on SB(n). For families where we can
obtain a bound that is sub-exponential in n, we can see that the RHS converges to 0 as n becomes
large. Hence, we will now upper-bound the shatter coefficient SB(n) for our setting.
Recall that we approximate the base classifier f around each data point x using a linear approxima-
tion fL(x
′) = f(x) + ∇f(x)⊤(x′ − x). We have seen that the robust set is the region enclosed
between a half-plane and the boundary of the set V (see Fig. 1 and Lemma 1).
x1ǫ
x2
ǫ
x3
ǫ
{}
Figure 2: We can compute an upper bound to SB by looking at the different regions formed by the robust sets
R(xi). The rightmost panel shows the superimposition of R(x1), R(x2), R(x3), showing the different subsets
formed.
We now want to upper-bound the maximum number of different partitions of {x1, x2, . . . , xn} that
can be formed by taking subsets specified by Bv for v ∈ V . Observe that overlaying all the robust
sets in V gives us a collection of regions, with the property that Bv ∪ {x1, x2, . . . , xn} is constant
when v is varied inside any region, as shown in Fig. 2.
This implies that an upper bound on SB(n) is equal to the number of distinct regions formed. When
we are in the 2-dimensional case, this is same as the number of regions formed by n lines in a plane,
which is known to be (n2 + n + 2)/2 = O(n2). For higher dimensionsm, the maximum possible
number of regions grows as O(nm). Thus the upper bound given by (19) reduces to:
E
X1,...,Xn∼pX
sup
v∈V
∣∣∣φn(v)− φ(v)∣∣∣ ≤ 4
√
m logn
n
. (20)
The above shows that as n gets larger, i.e., we take more and more samples (m is a constant), we
approach the best defense at a fast rate ofO(
√
logn/n). This bound indicates that efficient learning
7
from finite samples is possible. This is corroborated by our experiments, which show even faster
rates. We thus believe that our generalization analysis can be sharpened by using recent advances in
PAC-Bayesian learning theory, as well as modern extensions to VC-Theory.
6 Conclusion, Related Work and Future Directions
In this paper, we have proposed a game theoretic framework under which adversarial attacks and de-
fenses can be studied. Under a locally linear assumption on the decision boundary of the underlying
binary classifier, we identified a pair of attack and defense that exist in a Nash Equilibrium in our
framework. We then gave an optimization procedure to practically compute the equilibrium defense
for any given classifier, and derived generalization bounds for its performance on unseen test data.
There has been a lot of work on the task of classification in the presence of an adversary who can
make additive perturbations to the input before passing it to the classifier. There is a huge body
of work on empirical attacks in the literature [22, 25, 23, 27, 16, 3, 26, 4, 14, 9, 29], as well as
empirically motivated work trying to mitigate the proposed attacks [22, 8, 34, 32, 28]. Here, we will
focus on classical game-theoretic approaches to the problem of adversarial classification, as well as
other recent defenses for which one can get theoretical guarantees on the performance under attack.
Adversarial classification has been studied in the context of email spam detection, where we have a
dataset (X ,Y), and the adversary is allowed to modify the positive (spam) examples in the dataset
(i.e., data poisoning attack) by replacing (x, y) by (x′, y) where y = 1, incurring a cost of modifica-
tion c(x, x′) according to a cost function c. The defender is allowed to choose a classifier h, which
classifies any x ∈ X into two classes, i.e., spam or not spam. [6] studied a single shot non-zero
sum game with this setup, where the defender always chooses the naïve Bayes classifier given the
attacked dataset (X ′,Y). [6] set up an integer linear program to compute the best-response of the
attacker, and give algorithms to compute the solutions efficiently. [15] studied the same setup in
a sequential setting (called a Stackelberg game), where the attacker goes first and submits the per-
turbed dataset X ′ to the defender, who then learns the classifier having observed X ′. [15] showed
that the Stackelberg equilibrium can be approximated using optimization techniques, and provide
analyses for various classification losses. [35] analyzed the same setting where the classifier is now
an SVM classifier, and showed that the minmax optimization problem arising from the analysis of
the Nash Equilibrium of the game can be solved efficiently. [11] approached the problem from a
PAC-learning perspective, showing that under certain separability assumptions on the cost function
c one can efficiently learn a classifier that attains low error on the attacked training set, as well as
maximizes the defender’s utility.
A related line of work called adversarial hypothesis testing deals with modifications to the distribu-
tion pX from which the data is sampled instead of modifying the dataset per sample. The utility of
the defender now has an additional negative term corresponding to a discrepancy function between
the original pX and the modified distribution q. The defender now has to determine whether a given
sample of n points came from pX or q, and the defender’s utility consists of a tradeoff between the
Type-I and Type-II errors in this situation. [33] proved that mixed-strategy Nash equilibria exist in
this setting, characterized them, and proved convergence properties of the classification error.
Our work differs from past literature as our defender plays an additive perturbation, instead of giving
a classifier. In line with practice, we consider the base classifier fixed and provided to us to attack or
defend. Additionally, we focus on the case of an attacker that can perform additive perturbations.
Finally, our work links to a recent line of work on certifiable defenses for neural networks (we refer
the reader to [5] for a nice review). We focus here on randomized certifiable defenses. [17] gave
lower bounds on the robust accuracy of a randomized-smoothing defense via differential-privacy
analyses. Subsequently, [20, 5, 18] sharpened the analysis and presented alternative techniques to
obtain near-optimal smoothing guarantees for Gaussian smoothed classifiers. Our work comple-
ments these proof techniques in the literature as we use geometry of the robust sets as our primary
tool to analyze the equilibria, and their optimization and generalization properties.
There are several directions for future work. The first direction would be to extend our results to
accommodate locally curved decision boundaries. We suspect that for even further extensions to
base classifiers having arbitrarily complex decision boundaries, the style we use to show our gener-
alization results would not yield useful bounds, and we would have to resort to more sophisticated
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tools to show convergence to the optimal defense. The second direction would be to improve the
optimizer of φn, and obtain guarantees on the optimization error.
Broader Impact
At a high level, this work aims to provide a way to characterize adversarial attacks and defenses that
might be best for each other, in a game theoretic sense where the attacker cannot decrease the robust
accuracy further when the defense is fixed, and the defender cannot increase the robust accuracy
further when the attack is fixed. The technical contributions are novel geometry-flavored proof tech-
niques that can be used to analyze provable attacks and defenses, and a game-theoretic framework
to study such equilibria. Machine learning systems are increasingly being used in security-critical
applications, like healthcare and automated driving: our work can be used to find guarantees on the
worst accuracy a defended classifier can have under any attack. This is a step towards safe machine
learning, where the ultimate goal is to be able to construct classifiers whose performance cannot be
degraded by an adversary on most data-points with high probability.
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